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Abstract
The seminal work of Myerson (Mathematics of OR ’81) characterizes incentive-compatible
single-item auctions among bidders with independent valuations. In this setting, rela-
tively simple deterministic auction mechanisms achieve revenue optimality. When bid-
ders have correlated valuations, designing the revenue-optimal deterministic auction is a
computationally demanding problem; indeed, Papadimitriou and Pierrakos (STOC ’11)
proved that it is APX-hard, obtaining an explicit inapproximability factor of 1999/2000 =
99.95%. In the current paper, we strengthen this inapproximability factor to 63/64 ≈
98.5%. Our proof is based on a gap-preserving reduction from the Max-NM 3SAT
problem; a variant of the maximum satisfiability problem where each clause has exactly
3 literals and no clause contains both negated and unnegated literals. We furthermore
show that the gap between the revenue of deterministic and randomized auctions can be
as low as 13/14 ≈ 92.9%, improving an explicit gap of 947/948 ≈ 99.9% by Dobzinski,
Fu, and Kleinberg (STOC ’11).
1 Introduction
In the classical model of Auction Theory [Krishna, 2009], a seller auctions off an item to n
bidders with valuations for the item drawn independently from known but not necessarily
identical probability distributions. Myerson’s seminal work 1981 gives an elegant characteri-
zation of revenue-maximizing auctions in this setting. Optimal revenue is achieved by simple
deterministic auctions that are defined using succinct information about the probability dis-
tributions. In contrast, the case of bidders with correlated valuations has been a mystery;
in spite of the vast related literature in Economics and Computer Science, no such general
characterization result has been presented so far. Ronen [2001] was the first to consider an
inspirational alternative approach and provided an auction that approximates the revenue of
the optimal auction, contrary to the prevailing literature that was struggling for a character-
ization. More recently, Papadimitriou and Pierrakos [2011] provided an explanation — from
the computational complexity point of view — for the necessity of this alternative approach
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for the case of deterministic auctions by proving that the problem of designing the opti-
mal deterministic auction given the explicit description of the joint probability distribution
(with finite support) is APX-hard. Due to their simplicity and amenability to implement in
practice, deterministic auctions are of particular importance. Furthermore, Dobzinski et al.
[2011] provided a separation between randomized (truthful in expectation) and deterministic
truthful auctions: there are (single-item) settings in which randomized auctions may extract
strictly more revenue than any deterministic auction. Both results hold even when only three
bidders participate in the auction. In this paper, we strengthen both results.
Existing approaches to single-item auctions with non-independent bidders fall into three
different categories. A first approach that has been mostly followed by economists (e.g, see
[Constantin et al., 2007; Levin and Smith, 1996; Maskin, 2003; Milgrom and Weber, 1982])
assumes that each bidder has her own valuation function that depends on a shared random
variable; this model is usually referred to as the interdependent valuations model. In a second
approach, the support of the joint probability distribution is extremely large (exponentially
larger than the number of players or even infinite) and an auction mechanism can obtain
information about the distribution through queries (e.g, see [Dobzinski et al., 2011; Ronen,
2001; Ronen and Saberi, 2002]). The related literature focuses on the design of auctions
that use only a polynomial (in terms of the number of bidders) number of queries. In the
third one, the joint probability has finite support and the related work seeks for auctions
that are defined in polynomial time in terms of the support size and the number of players
(e.g, see [Dobzinski et al., 2011; Papadimitriou and Pierrakos, 2011]). The last two models
are known as the query model and the explicit model, respectively. Among these models, the
explicit one allows us to view the design of the revenue-optimal (deterministic) auction as a
standard optimization problem. The auction has to define the bidder that gets the item and
her payment to the auctioneer for every valuation vector of the support of the joint probability
distribution. Both the allocation and the payments should be defined in such a way that no
bidder has an incentive to misreport her true valuation; this constraint is known as incentive
compatibility. The objective is to maximize the expected revenue of the auctioneer over all
valuation vectors.
Since our purpose is to explore the limitations of deterministic auctions, we focus on the
explicit model and the case of three bidders. Following [Papadimitriou and Pierrakos, 2011],
we refer to the optimization problem mentioned above (when restricted to three bidders) as
3OptimalAuctionDesign. The inapproximability bound presented by Papadimitriou and
Pierrakos [2011] is marginally smaller than 1, namely 1999/2000 > 99.9%. It is achieved by a
gap-preserving reduction from a structured maximum satisfiability problem called CatSat.
This problem has an inapproximability of 79/80; hence, the gap obtained for 3OptimalAuc-
tionDesign is even closer to 1. We present a different reduction from Max-NM 3SAT; a
variant of the maximum satisfiability problem where each clause has exactly 3 literals and no
clause contains both negated and unnegated literals. This problem is shown in [Guruswami
and Khot, 2005] to maintain the 7/8 inapproximability factor of the classical MAX 3SAT prob-
lem. Our reduction yields a significantly improved inapproximability bound of 63/64 ≈ 98.5%
for 3OptimalAuctionDesign1. Furthermore, we demonstrate a rather significant revenue
1We note that a significantly more involved reduction from the problem of maximizing the number of
satisfied linear equations in an over-determined system of linear equations modulo 2 yields a slightly stronger
inapproximability factor of 57/58 ≈ 98.3 as is shown in the conference version of the current paper [Caragiannis
et al., 2013]. Following the suggestion of an anonymous reviewer, we have chosen to present the simpler
reduction from Max-NM 3SAT here.
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gap between deterministic truthful mechanisms and randomized auctions that are truthful
in expectation; the revenue of any deterministic auction can be at most 13/14 ≈ 92.9% of
the optimal randomized one. This result improves the previously known explicit bound of
947/948 ≈ 99.9% of Dobzinski et al. [2011]. Our construction is considerably simpler than
the one in [Dobzinski et al., 2011].
Related work Extending Myerson’s work, Cre´mer and McLean [1985; 1988] characterize
the information structure that guarantees the auctioneer full surplus, under several settings
with correlated valuations. They consider interim individual rationality which allows players
to have negative utility for some valuation vectors. In contrast, our work (as well as more
recent related work) focuses on ex post individual rationality, a design requirement that does
not allow such situations. Ronen [2001] and Ronen and Saberi [2002] consider single-item
optimal auctions in the query model. They design auctions that use queries of the following
form: given the valuations of a set of players, what is the conditional distribution of the
remaining ones? The 1-lookahead auction in [Ronen, 2001] yields at least half the optimal
revenue to the seller. Essentially, the auction ignores the n−1 lowest bids and offers the item
to the remaining bidder at the price that maximizes the revenue considering the distribution
of valuations of that bidder conditioned on the valuations of everybody else. Ronen and Saberi
[2002] present several impossibility results for auctions of particular type. For example, they
prove that no ascending auction can approximate the optimal revenue to a factor greater than
7/8.
Dobzinski et al. [2011] consider k-lookahead auctions (a natural extension of 1-lookahead)
and show that a 2/3-approximation of the optimal revenue can be achieved by randomized
auctions in the query model. For the explicit model, they show that the optimal randomized
auction can be computed by linear programming while the deterministic 2-lookahead auction
achieves a 3/5-approximation of revenue. Their positive results have been strengthened by
Chen et al. [2011] to approximation factors of 0.731 and 0.622, respectively. Both Dobzinski
et al. [2011] and Papadimitriou and Pierrakos [2011] prove that revenue-optimal auction
design can be solved in polynomial time in the 2-bidder case. The 2-bidder case has also been
considered in [Eso¨, 2005] and [Diakonikolas et al., 2012]. In particular, Diakonikolas et al.
[2012] study the tradeoff between efficiency and revenue in deterministic truthful auctions
and prove that any point of the Pareto curve can be approximated with arbitrary precision.
Roughgarden and Talgam-Cohen [2013] examine the assumptions that are required for an
analog to the Myerson’s optimal auction theory to apply to several interdependent valuation
models. In particular for the correlated private valuations case they show that regularity and
affiliation of the distributions of valuations (infinite support) are sufficient conditions.
Roadmap The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We begin with preliminary defini-
tions in Section 2. The reduction and the proof of the inapproximability of 3OptimalAuc-
tionDesign are presented in Sections 3 and 4, respectively. The revenue-gap construction is
presented in Section 5.
2 Preliminaries
We consider having a single indivisible item for sale and n players competing for that item.
Each player has a finite number of possible (scalar) valuations for the item, but the valuations
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of all players are correlated. Let D denote the joint probability distribution over valuation
vectors v = (v1, . . . , vn), where vi denotes the valuation of player i. An auction mechanism
M decides the probability xi(v) that player i is allocated the item, and her payment pi(v) in
advance, for every valuation vector in the support of D. The allocation probabilities can be
considered as allocating fractions of the item to players under the restriction that the total
allocation fraction is at most 1 for every possible valuation vector v, i.e.,
∑
i xi(v) ≤ 1.
The mechanism has no way of knowing which valuation vector is eventually realized, and
the actual outcome is based on the declarations of valuations of the players (bids). Whenever
the players bid as in b = (b1, . . . , bn), the (expected) utility of player i is defined as
ui(b) = xi(b) · vi − pi(b).
Players are assumed to be utility-maximizers which implies that a player declares the valuation
that maximizes her utility given the bids of everybody else. We adopt the point of view of
the auctioneer and examine the problem of designing an auction mechanism that satisfies
some desirable properties. Incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and the no-positive-
transfers property are classically considered as important desiderata for auction mechanisms
[Krishna, 2009; Nisan et al., 2007], and revenue maximization is an obvious objective. In what
follows we introduce some additional notation so that we can formally define these notions.
We use v−i to denote the vector of valuations of all players but i, and (v
′
i,v−i) to denote the
valuation vector that is derived by v if only player i’s valuation is swapped from vi to v
′
i; note
that v = (vi,v−i). The incentive compatibility property requires that truth-telling maximizes
players’ utility, i.e., for every player i, vi, v−i and v
′




xi(v) · vi − pi(v) ≥ xi(v
′
i,v−i) · vi − pi(v
′
i,v−i).
Henceforth, we assume each player always submits as bid her actual valuation for the item,
since vector b(v) = v is utility-maximizing for all players given an incentive compatible mech-
anism; we also refer to such mechanisms as truthful mechanisms. The individual rationality
property encourages players to participate in the auction. In particular, we consider ex post
individual rationality that requires that players always have non-negative utility. In other
words, for every player i and valuation vector v, it holds that
xi(v) · vi − pi(v) ≥ 0.
Finally, the no-positive-transfers property implies that the players never receive payments
from the auctioneer, i.e.,
pi(v) ≥ 0,
for every player i and valuation vector v.
As we have mentioned above, an obvious objective for auction mechanisms is the maxi-
mization of the expected revenue, i.e., the expectation over all valuation vectors of the pay-
ment received by the auctioneer. Let p denote the payments applied by mechanism M. The







We note that the revenue-maximizing truthful-in-expectation mechanism in the explicit set-
ting of correlated valuations can be computed in polynomial time by a linear program [Dobzin-
ski et al., 2011].
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In the more restricted setting where the possible valuations of player i, for i = 1, . . . , n,
must form a continuous interval, it is a well-known fact (see Chapter 13 of [Nisan et al.,
2007]) that a mechanism is truthful (in expectation) if and only if the following two con-
ditions hold: the allocation x is monotone (i.e., for every player i, vi, v−i, and v
′
i ≥ vi
it holds that xi(v
′
i,v−i) ≥ xi(v),) and the payments are computed according to pi(v) =
x(v) · vi −
∫ vi
0 xi(z,v−i)dz. In the explicit setting of correlated valuations that we examine,
the distribution of valuations has finite support. In this case, we can limit our search to
monotone allocations and a specific payment function, using the following observation.
Observation 1 A randomized, single-item auction mechanism M satisfies the following:
• If M = (x,p) is truthful in expectation, then
- allocation x is monotone, i.e., for all i, v−i, vi, and v
′








i ,v−i) = xi(v
λ












where vλi is the λ-th possible valuation of i such that (v
λ
i ,v−i) occurs with positive
probability
• If M = (x,p) satisfies that allocation x is monotone and p is defined as above, then M
is truthful in expectation
For completeness, we provide the proof of this observation in Appendix A. Notice that a
monotone allocation implies payments that satisfy pi(v
λ
i ,v−i) ≥ x(v
λ
i ,v−i) · v
s
i , where v
s
i is
the smallest valuation such that x(vsi ,v−i) > 0, i.e., player i has non-zero probability of
getting the item. Also, note that, given a monotone allocation, applying payments according
to equality (1) implies individual rationality and the no-positive-transfers property. As we are
only interested in truthful mechanisms that satisfy these properties and maximize revenue, we
can assume that a mechanismM is entirely defined by its allocation A and assigns payments
according to equality (1); we denote the revenue of M as rev(A). Moreover, it suffices to
consider only monotone allocations.
In Sections 3 and 4, we focus on deterministic auction mechanisms, where the allocation
probabilities satisfy xi(v) ∈ {0, 1}, for i = 1, . . . , n. The search space is now restricted to
(deterministic) monotone allocations and corresponding threshold payment functions; their
definition can be made more intuitive in the deterministic setting (e.g., see [Papadimitriou
and Pierrakos, 2011]) as follows. An allocation is monotone if when the item is allocated to
some player i for some valuation vector v, i.e., xi(v) = 1, then player i is also allocated the
item for (v′i,v−i) with v
′
i > vi, i.e., xi(v
′
i,v−i) = 1 for any v
′
i > vi. A threshold payment for
a winning player i is then defined as the infimum valuation v′′i so that player i gets the item
for the valuation vector (v′′i ,v−i).
We consider auctions with three players and adopt a geometric representation of the
problem that first appeared in [Papadimitriou and Pierrakos, 2011]. We assume that D is
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defined by a set S of points in R3 and consider weights associated with these points. We refer
to the three players as player x, y, and z; a point of S corresponds to a valuation vector where
players x, y, and z have as valuation the x-, y-, and z-coordinate of the point. The weight of a
point indicates the probability that the corresponding valuation vector is realized. Naturally,
we refer to allocations of points to players to imply which player is allocated the item whenever
the particular valuation vector (point) is realized. In the following, we say that two points
are x-aligned (resp., y-aligned, z-aligned) if they have the same y- and z-coordinates (resp.,
x- and z-coordinates, x- and y-coordinates). Given a deterministic mechanism, monotonicity
implies that if a point p is allocated to a player (say, x), then all points that are x-aligned
with p and have higher x-coordinate are enforced to be allocated to player x as well (similarly
for the other players). The payment associated with a point p that is allocated to player x is
then the lowest x-coordinate of the x-aligned points with p that are allocated to x (similarly
for the other players). For randomized allocations, where the allocation of points is fractional,
the monotonicity requirement and the payments are correspondingly defined.
The problem of designing the optimal deterministic auction mechanism is stated as follows:
3OptimalAuctionDesign Given a finite set of points S ⊂ R3 and associated weights,
compute a monotone allocation of the points of S to players x, y, and z so that the
weighted sum of the implied threshold payments (expected revenue) is maximized.
3 The inapproximability result – The construction
In this section we present our gap-preserving reduction from Max-NM 3SAT to 3Opti-
malAuctionDesign.
Max-NM 3SAT: Consider a set of n binary variables V1, . . . , Vn and a CNF formula Φ of
m clauses with exactly 3 literals per clause such that no clause is mixed, i.e., no clause
contains both negated and unnegated literals. Find an assignment of the variables that
maximizes the number of satisfied clauses.
Consider an instance of Max-NM 3SAT, i.e., a CNF formula Φ of m clauses on a set of
n variables Vi, for i = 1, . . . , n. Each clause of Φ is either of the form (Vh1 ∨ Vh2 ∨ Vh3) or
of the form (¬Vh1 ∨ ¬Vh2 ∨ ¬Vh3), with 1 ≤ h1 < h2 < h3 ≤ n. We use the notation c(h),
for h = 1, . . . ,m, to identify the clauses. Let di be the degree of variable Vi, i.e., the number
of equations in which Vi participates either as a negated literal or as an unnegated one.
We construct an instance R(Φ) of 3OptimalAuctionDesign such that the majority of the
points lie inside a specified region whose boundaries are very close to 1. Given the acceptable
range of coordinates for the points of R(I), it suffices to specify only their relative position to
sketch the proof of our result. Providing such a description of the reduced construction serves
two purposes; it keeps the presentation clear and at the same time gives a more intuitive
overview of the construction. For completeness, right after the presentation of each gadget,
we also give the exact coordinates of a set of points that formally prove our statements in
specified paragraphs or tables.
Note that the constructed 3OptimalAuctionDesign instance has a polynomial number
of points, and that both the coordinates of the points and their weights are rational numbers
that require only polynomial precision. Without loss of generality, we consider weights that
do not sum up to 1 and we consistently compute the revenue contributed by (the allocation
of) a point as the product of the threshold payment and its weight.
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We are now ready to present our construction. R(Φ) contains one variable gadget and
one clause gadget per clause. Most of the points of each of the gadgets have coordinates in
(1 − θ, 1 + θ) where θ ∈ (0, 1/5600) is a very small constant. We refer to all these points as
the main part of the construction. The only points that lie outside this region satisfy some
particular properties and are called blockers. We begin with the description of blockers, which
are extensively used afterwards.
3.1 Blockers
Our reduction uses a special class of points which we call blockers. The idea is that a blocker
can prevent the allocation of a set of points to a certain player. Blockers essentially play the
same role that scaffolding segments play in the reduction of [Papadimitriou and Pierrakos,
2011], but our reduction uses considerably fewer ones; this allows for a much smaller overhead
in the optimal revenue and an improved inapproximability result.
Consider a set of c ≥ 1 points ui, for i = 1, . . . , c, that belong to the main part of the
construction. Let ui, i = 1, . . . , c, have weight wi and lie at (xi, y, z); the points are x-aligned,
and all their coordinates y, z, and xi, for i = 1, . . . , c, are at most 1 + θ. Let W denote their
total weight, i.e, W =
∑c
i=1 wi. Now, consider a point b with negligibly small weight θ that
is also x-aligned with the aforementioned points. Let b be located exactly at (xb, y, z) where
xb is such that θxb = (W + θ)(1 + θ). The only way to obtain considerable revenue from b
is to allocate it to x; in any other case, the revenue derived by b would be at most θ(1 + θ).
Furthermore, allocating any other point among u1, u2, . . . , uc, together with b to x would not
increase the revenue of the allocation. To see why this is true, observe that the contribution
of b to the revenue is θxb = (W +θ)(1+θ) if b is allocated to x, whereas by allocating some of
the other points and b to player x, their contribution to the revenue is less than (W+θ)(1+θ).
We conclude that in a revenue-optimal allocation, b is allocated to player x and each point
ui is allocated to either y or z or is not allocated at all; we say that b x-blocks the points
u1, . . . , uc, and we call b a blocker. The properties of blockers that y-block or z-block other
points are defined accordingly.
From this point on, since we are only interested in revenue-optimal allocations, we assume
that blockers are always allocated towards their “preferred” direction and points that are
blocked are never allocated towards their blocked direction (we ignore any other possibility
whenever we consider the possible allocations of a specific set of points).
Our construction consists of several gadgets, i.e., one variable gadget and two kinds of
clause gadgets. The variable gadget contains points that correspond to variables and have
only two possible allocations (the third direction is blocked). These allocations correspond
to setting the variable to 0 or 1, respectively, in the original Max-NM 3SAT instance. We
also create one clause gadget for each clause of Φ. There are several additional points (we
call them connection points), which are insignificant in terms of the revenue they generate,
but are very important in the following sense: the allocation of the connection points is
completely determined by the allocation of the variable points and it affects the allocation of
the points in the clause gadgets, hence the revenue that is generated by them. In other words,
the allocation of the variable points completely determines the maximum attainable revenue
from our construction, in a similar way as the assignment of values to variables determines
the number of satisfiable clauses in the original instance. We now present these gadgets in
more detail.
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3.2 The variable gadget
The role of the variable gadget is twofold. The allocation of some of the points indicates the
assignment of values to the variables of the original instance Φ, while other points aid the
connection to the clause gadgets.
The variable gadget For every variable Vi, i = 1, . . . , n, the variable gadget has a variable
point vi with weight di(1/2 + 5θ). All these points are x-aligned with (1, 1, 1) so that
the x-coordinate of vi+1 is higher than the x-coordinate of vi. For each appearance
of variable Vi in a clause c(h), there is one connection point Hi(h) with weight θ.
Point Hi(h) is either y-aligned of z-aligned with vi depending on whether Vi appears
as a negated or an unnegated literal in c(h), respectively. The exact location of these
points will become clear after the description of the clause gadgets. Recall that all
the aforementioned points have coordinates in [1, 1 + θ). We also add a blocker b that
x-blocks the set of variable points.
Exact location Let ǫ = θ/max{n+2,m+1}. The variable point vi is located at (1+iǫ, 1, 1)
and has weight di(1/2+5θ). The blocker b is located at ((3m(1/2+5θ)+θ)(1+θ)/θ, 1, 1)
and has weight θ. Regarding the x-coordinate of b, note that
∑n
i=1 di = 3m.
To give some intuition regarding the variable gadget, we note (and provide a formal proof
later) that the weight di(1/2 + 5θ) of point vi is significantly high so that at any revenue-
optimal allocation, point vi should be allocated to either player y or player z; these allocations
correspond to setting variable Vi to values 1 and 0, respectively. Due to monotonicity, this
enforces the allocation of the y-aligned or z-aligned connection points; intuitively, this prop-
agates the fact that the variable Vi is set to a certain value to the clause gadgets.
3.3 The clause gadgets
We continue by presenting the clause gadgets and clarify their connection to the variable
gadget. For each clause of Φ, we define a clause gadget of a particular type depending
on whether the particular clause contains negated or unnegated literals. For two x-aligned
points p and q of the main part of the construction, we use the notation p(+x)q and p(−x)q to
denote that q has larger and smaller x-coordinate than p, respectively (similarly for the other
coordinates).
The clause gadget corresponding to clause c(h) = (Vi ∨ Vj ∨ Vk) The clause gadget cor-





and 2 blockers. All these points have y-coordinate in (1 − θ, 1), i.e.,
they lie below the plane y = 1. Points A(h), C(h), and E(h) have weight 1, while
points B(h) and D(h) have weight θ. The points A(h), C(h), and E(h) are y-aligned to
the connection points Hi(h), Hj(h), and Hk(h), respectively. Point A(h) is z-blocked
by blocker bA(h) while point E(h) is x-blocked by blocker bE(h). See Figure 1.
Exact location The exact location of the points comprising the clause gadget corresponding
to clause c(h) = (Vi ∨ Vj ∨ Vk) and the corresponding connection points towards the
variable gadget appears at Table 1.
We note that from this point on, we only consider blockers that are used to block a single
point of weight 1. So, we point out that they all have the same weight θ as well as the same
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Table 1: The points in the clause gadget associated with clause c(h) = (Vi ∨ Vj ∨ Vk) and the
corresponding connection points.
Point cx cy cz Weight
A(h) 1 + iǫ 1− hǫ 1 + hǫ+ 2ǫ/3 1
B(h) 1 + jǫ 1− hǫ 1 + hǫ+ 2ǫ/3 θ
C(h) 1 + jǫ 1− hǫ 1 + hǫ+ ǫ/3 1
D(h) 1 + kǫ 1− hǫ 1 + hǫ+ ǫ/3 θ
E(h) 1 + kǫ 1− hǫ 1 + hǫ 1
bA(h) 1 + iǫ 1− hǫ (1 + θ)
2/θ θ
bE(h) (1 + θ)
2/θ 1− hǫ 1 + hǫ θ
Hi(h) 1 + iǫ 1 1 + hǫ+ 2ǫ/3 θ
Hj(h) 1 + jǫ 1 1 + hǫ+ ǫ/3 θ
Hk(h) 1 + kǫ 1 1 + hǫ θ
coordinate (1+ θ)2/θ in the dimension that they block. Points with negligibly small weight θ
that are part of the gadgets are crucial since they indirectly influence the allocation of unit-
weight points, e.g., B(h) prevents A(h) and C(h) to be allocated to x and z, respectively,
at the same time. However, the allocation itself of these points does not contribute much to
the revenue, since all possible threshold payments (all their coordinates) are at most 1 + θ.
In order to keep the analysis as simple as possible we focus on the allocation of unit-weight
points for now, but note that the revenue of all points is accounted for at the end.
Consider a monotone allocation in which the connection points Hi(h), Hj(h), and Hk(h)
are allocated to players x or z. In this case, we say that the clause gadget is non-breathing in
the sense that none of the points A(h), C(h), and E(h) can be allocated to player y. Hence,
among the monotone allocations in which the clause gadget is non-breathing, the one that
maximizes revenue leaves one of A(h), C(h), and E(h) unallocated. In contrast, if some of
the connection points (say Hj(h)) is not allocated to players x or z (i.e., the clause gadget
is breathing), the contribution of A(h), C(h), and E(h) can increase by allocating A(h) and
B(h) to player x, C(h) and Hj(h) to player y, and D(h) and E(h) to player z. The other
cases (i.e., when Hi(h) or Hk(h) are not allocated to the aforementioned players) have similar
allocations of improved revenue.
The clause gadgets corresponding to clauses of the form (¬Vi ∨¬Vj ∨¬Vk) are symmetric
and have identical properties. An exact description follows.
The clause gadget corresponding to clause c(h) = (¬Vi ∨ ¬Vj ∨ ¬Vk) The clause gad-





and 2 blockers. All these points have z-coordinate in (1−θ, 1), i.e., they
lie behind the plane z = 1. Points A(h), C(h), and E(h) have weight 1, while points
B(h) and D(h) have weight θ. The points A(h), C(h), and E(h) are z-aligned to the
points Hi(h), Hj(h), and Hk(h), respectively. Point A(h) is y-blocked by blocker bA(h)
while point E(h) is x-blocked by blocker bE(h). See Figure 1.
Exact location The exact location of the points comprising the clause gadget corresponding
to clause c(h) = (¬Vi ∨ ¬Vj ∨ ¬Vk) and the corresponding connection points towards
the variable gadget appears at Table 2.
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Table 2: The points in the clause gadget associated with clause c(h) = (¬Vi∨¬Vj ∨¬Vk) and
the corresponding connection points.
Point cx cy cz Weight
A(h) 1 + iǫ 1 + hǫ+ 2ǫ/3 1− hǫ 1
B(h) 1 + jǫ 1 + hǫ+ 2ǫ/3 1− hǫ θ
C(h) 1 + jǫ 1 + hǫ+ ǫ/3 1− hǫ 1
D(h) 1 + kǫ 1 + hǫ+ ǫ/3 1− hǫ θ
E(h) 1 + kǫ 1 + hǫ 1− hǫ 1
bA(h) 1 + iǫ (1 + θ)
2/θ 1− hǫ θ
bE(h) (1 + θ)
2/θ 1 + hǫ 1− hǫ θ
Hi(h) 1 + iǫ 1 + hǫ+ 2ǫ/3 1 θ
Hj(h) 1 + jǫ 1 + hǫ+ ǫ/3 1 θ
Hk(h) 1 + kǫ 1 + hǫ 1 θ
Among the allocations in which the connection points Hi(h), Hj(h) and Hk(h) are allocated
to players y or x (i.e., the clause gadget is non-breathing), the one that maximizes revenue
leaves one of A(h), C(h), and E(h) unallocated. In contrast, if some of the connection
points (say Hj(h)) is not allocated to players x or y (i.e., the clause gadget is breathing), the
contribution of A(h), C(h), and E(h) can increase by allocating A(h) and B(h) to player x,
C(h) and Hj(h) to z, and D(h) and E(h) to y. The other cases (i.e., when Hi(h) or Hk(h)
are not allocated to the aforementioned players) have similar allocations of improved revenue.
An important property is that points in different clause gadgets are never aligned. This
is achieved by dedicating a distinct xz-plane for the points in the gadget associated with any
clause c(h) = (Vi ∨ Vj ∨ Vk), and dedicating a distinct xy-plane for the points in the gadget
associated with any clause c(h) = (¬Vi ∨ ¬Vj ∨ ¬Vk).
4 The inapproximability result – The Analysis
We show that the optimal revenue in the reduced instance R(Φ) of 3OptimalAuctionDe-
sign strongly depends on the maximum number of satisfied clauses in the original formula
Φ of Max-NM 3-SAT. Since approximating the second objective is hard, we show that
approximating the first objective is also hard.
Consider a clause c(h) consisting of variables Vi, Vj, and Vk, the corresponding gadget,
and an allocation of variable points vi, vj , and vk to players y and z. Our reduction relies
on a relation between monotone allocations in R(Φ) and assignments for the variables in Φ.
In particular, we associate the allocation of a variable point to player y (resp., to player z)
with the assignment of value 1 (resp., 0) to its corresponding variable. Then, we can easily
verify that the clause gadget associated with c(h) is breathing if and only if the allocation of
the variable points vi, vj, and vk implies an assignment that satisfies clause c(h). Our bound
follows by considering the gap in achievable revenue by a clause gadget depending on whether
the corresponding clause is breathing or not.
Our analysis exploits a particular type of monotone allocations, defined as follows.
Definition 1 An allocation A of instance R(Φ) is called simple if for every connection point
that is allocated to a player, unallocating it violates monotonicity.
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c(h) = (¬Vi ∨ ¬Vj ∨ ¬Vk)
c(h) = (Vi ∨ Vj ∨ Vk)
Hi(h)
Figure 1: The clause gadgets corresponding to a clause c(h) in the two cases where c(h) =
(Vi ∨ Vj ∨ Vk) (set of points with z-coordinate higher than 1) and c(h) = (¬Vi ∨ ¬Vj ∨ ¬Vk)
(set of points with y-coordinate higher than 1). Large black disks represent unit-weight or
variable points, smaller black disks represent connection points or θ-weight points, whereas
white disks represent blockers.
Simple allocations are used as an intermediate step in the analysis and their correspondence to
monotone allocations is revealed later. When accounting for the revenue of a simple allocation
A, we use a simplified version that disregards the revenue obtained by connection points as
well as non-blocker points with weight θ; we refer to such points as θ-weight points. We
consider the revenue of the remaining points in several steps of our analysis and refer to it
using the following definition.
Definition 2 The revenue of a simple allocation A of R(I) that is due (only) to variable
points, blockers and unit-weight points in clause gadgets is called discounted revenue and is
denoted by drev(A).
The following lemma bounds the discounted revenue derived by a clause gadget depending
on whether it is breathing or not.
Lemma 1 Consider a simple allocation of maximum discounted revenue. If the gadget cor-
responding to a clause c(h) is breathing, then its contribution to the discounted revenue is at
least 5 + 3θ + 2θ2 and at most 5 + 6θ + 2θ2. If it is not breathing, its contribution to the
discounted revenue is at least 4 + 4θ + 2θ2 and at most 4 + 6θ + 2θ2.
Proof. We account for the revenue from every clause gadget both in case it is breathing and
in case it is non-breathing (see the description in Section 3). Note that the allocation of each
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gadget does not affect the allocation of any other gadget in the construction, since points in
different clause gadgets are never aligned. Consider a clause c(h) = (Vi ∨ Vj ∨ Vk) and the
corresponding gadget (the case of c(h) = (¬Vi ∨ ¬Vj ∨ ¬Vk) is identical). It is not hard to
see that the main part of the gadget (excluding the blockers) contributes at least 3 − θ and
at most 3 + 2θ to the (maximum) discounted revenue if it is breathing, while it contributes
at least 2 and at most 2 + 2θ if it is non-breathing. Also, each of the blockers in the clause
gadgets contributes exactly (1 + θ)2 to the revenue. We can now easily obtain each of the
desired bounds by summing the corresponding terms. For example, the contribution of a
breathing clause gadget to the (maximum) discounted revenue is at least 3−θ+2(1+θ)2 and
it is at most 3+2θ+2(1+ θ)2, while the contribution of a non-breathing clause gadget to the
(maximum) discounted revenue is at least 2+ 2(1+ θ)2 and it is at most 2+ 2θ+2(1+ θ)2.
Note that the definition of simple allocations implies that a connection point is allocated to
a player only if the allocation of its aligned variable point or clause gadget point also enforces
it to be allocated to the same player. In particular, if the variable point vi is not allocated,
then the fact that the allocation is simple implies that all connection points aligned to vi
are not enforced by vi and, hence, the clause gadgets corresponding to equations in which Vi
participates are all breathing. The next lemma implies that we only need to consider simple
allocations where all variable points are allocated to some player (either y or z).
Lemma 2 The simple allocation of maximum discounted revenue is complete, i.e., all vari-
able points are allocated to players y and z.
Proof. Consider a non-complete simple allocation in which variable point vi has not been
allocated to any player. We allocate the variable point vi to the player among y and z
that maximizes the number of breathing clause gadgets. Clearly, for every clause c(h) =
(Vi ∨ Vj ∨ Vk) (similarly for c(h) = (¬Vi ∨ ¬Vj ∨ ¬Vk)) such that some of the variable points
vj and vk are not allocated, the gadget remains breathing no matter how the variable point
vi is allocated. For every clause c(h) such that variable points vj and vk are allocated (to
players y or z), there is an allocation of vi to either player y or player z that leaves the gadget
corresponding to c(h) breathing. Hence, there is an allocation of vi such that at most di/2
clause gadgets become non-breathing. By Lemma 1, the contribution from these gadgets to
the discounted revenue decreases by at most (1+ 2θ)di/2. The contribution of the remaining
(at most di) gadgets decreases by at most 3θdi. Clearly, the total decrease in discounted
revenue is smaller than the additional revenue di(1/2 + 5θ) obtained by the allocation of vi.
Now, we are ready to show the correspondence between the simple allocations that we
have considered so far and the monotone allocations of instance R(Φ).
Lemma 3 For every monotone allocation A with revenue rev(A), there is a complete simple
allocation A′ such that drev(A′) ≥ rev(A)− 10mθ.
Proof. Given the monotone allocation A, we construct a simple allocation A′′ by allocating
variable points, clause gadget points of weight 1, and blockers as in A. Among the connection
points, the only ones that are allocated to some player (like in A) are the ones whose allocation
is enforced. By Lemma 2, there is a complete simple allocation A′ with discounted revenue
drev(A′) ≥ drev(A′′). The lemma follows since the total number of connection points and
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θ-weight points in clause gadgets is 5m and the contribution of each of them to the revenue
of A cannot exceed θ(1 + θ) < 2θ.
Since θ has an extremely small value in our construction, it is clear that the optimal
discounted revenue over complete simple allocations is a very good approximation of the
optimal revenue over all monotone allocations. The proof of the next lemma exploits this
observation.
Lemma 4 If the maximum number of satisfied clauses in Φ is K, then the revenue in the
revenue-optimal monotone allocation of R(Φ) is between (7−70θ)m+K and (7+70θ)m+K.
Proof. Let us consider an optimal assignment of values to the variables of Φ so that K
clauses are satisfied. We construct a complete simple allocation A for R(Φ) as follows. For
every variable Vi that is set to 0 (resp., to 1), we allocate the variable point vi to player




2 + 5θ) ≥ 3m/2
to the discounted revenue of A. The blocker b is allocated to player x and contributes
(3m(12 + 5θ) + θ)(1 + θ) ≥ 3m/2 to the discounted revenue. Then, every clause gadget
corresponding to a true (resp., false) clause is breathing (resp., non-breathing). The points in
the clause gadgets are allocated so that their contribution to the discounted revenue is as high
as possible. By Lemma 1, we have that the contribution of a breathing clause gadget to the
discounted revenue is at least 5+3θ+2θ2 ≥ 5. For each clause that is false, the corresponding
clause gadget is non-breathing. Hence, its contribution to the discounted revenue is at least
4 + 4θ + 2θ2 ≥ 4. So, the total discounted revenue is at least
3m/2 + 3m/2 + 5K + 4(m−K) ≥ (7− 70θ)m+K.
Clearly, the right-hand side of this inequality is a lower bound on the revenue of the revenue-
optimal monotone allocation as well.
Now, consider a complete simple allocation of maximum discounted revenue and the as-
signment of values to the variables Vi this allocation implies. Consider the clauses whose
corresponding gadgets are breathing. By our construction, this implies that the clauses are
satisfied by the assignment; so, there are at most K such clauses and the remaining m −K
clause gadgets are non-breathing. In total, using Lemma 1, the discounted revenue of the




+ 5θ) + (3m(
1
2
+ 5θ) + θ)(1 + θ) +K(5 + 6θ + 2θ2) + (m−K)(4 + 6θ + 2θ2)
< (7 + 60θ)m+K.
Hence, by Lemma 3, the revenue-optimal monotone allocation has revenue at most (7 +
70θ)m+K.
We are ready to prove our main result.
Theorem 1 For every constant δ ∈ (0, 1/2), it is NP-hard to approximate 3OptimalAuc-
tionDesign within a factor 63+δ64−δ .
Proof. Let δ ∈ (0, 1/2), η = δ/10 and θ = δ/2800. We know from [Guruswami and Khot,
2005] that given Φ, it is NP-hard to distinguish cases where the maximum number of satisfied
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clauses is at least (1 − η)m or at most (7/8 + η)m, Lemma 4 implies that distinguishing
between cases where the maximum revenue among all monotone allocations of R(Φ) is at
least (7−70θ)m+(1−η)m = (64−δ)m/8 and at most (7+70θ)m+(7/8+η)m = (63+δ)m/8
is NP-hard as well.
5 Deterministic vs randomized auctions
We now present the upper bound on the revenue-gap between deterministic and randomized
mechanisms.
Theorem 2 The revenue obtained by the optimal deterministic truthful mechanism can be at
most 1314 of the revenue obtained by the optimal truthful-in-expectation mechanism.
Proof. We present an instance of 3OptimalAuctionDesign such that the revenue-maximizing
deterministic monotone allocation yields revenue at most 13/14 of the revenue that can be
derived by a randomized monotone allocation. The main part of our construction consists
of 15 points, the coordinates of which are in (1 − θ, 1 + θ), for some arbitrarily small θ > 0.
Additionally, there are 7 points which we call blockers and have identical properties to the
blockers described in Section 3.1. Each blocker is x-, y-, or z-aligned to some other point and
its corresponding coordinate is exceptionally large. The weights and coordinates of all points
are such that blockers are always allocated towards their “preferred” direction and points
that are blocked are never allocated towards their blocked direction, at any deterministic
revenue-optimal allocation.
Again, we use the notation p(+x)q and p(−x)q, for two x-aligned points p and q of the
main part of the construction, to denote that q has larger and smaller x-coordinate than p,
respectively (similarly for the other coordinates). The main part of our construction consists
of two separate 7-sequences of points P and Q, and an extra point u that connects them. We
begin with a description of the relative position of the points of our construction and then
give the exact coordinates in Table 3 (see also Figure 2).
Gadget P Let P : [p1(−y)p2(+z)p3(−x)p4(+y)p5(−z)p6(+y)p7] be such that p1 and p7 are x-
aligned. Points p2, p4, and p6 have weight 1, while points p1, p3, p5, and p7 have weight
θ. Point p2 is x-blocked by blocker b(p2), point p4 is z-blocked by blocker b(p4), and
point p6 is x-blocked by blocker b(p6). Among the deterministic monotone allocations
in which points p1 and p7 are allocated to player x or z, the one that maximizes revenue
should leave at least one of the points p2, p4, and p6 unallocated. In contrast, if for
example p1 is not allocated to either x or z, the contribution of p2, p4, and p6 can
increase by allocating p2 to player y, p4 to player x, and p6 to player z. The case where
p7 is allocated to neither x nor z admits a similar allocation of improved revenue.
Gadget Q Let Q : [q1(−z)q2(+x)q3(−y)q4(+z)q5(−x)q6(+z)q7] be such that q1 and q7 are y-
aligned. Points q2, q4, and q6 have weight 1, while points q1, q3, q5, and q7 have weight
θ. Point q2 is y-blocked by blocker b(q2), point q4 is x-blocked by blocker b(q4), and
point q6 is y-blocked by blocker b(q6). Among the deterministic monotone allocations
in which both points q1 and q7 are allocated to player y or x, the one that maximizes
revenue should leave at least one of the points q2, q4, and q6 unallocated. In contrast,
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if for example q1 is not allocated to either y or x, the contribution of q2, q4, and q6 can
increase by allocating q2 to player z, q4 to player y, and q6 to player x. The case where
q7 is allocated to neither y nor x admits a similar allocation of improved revenue.
Point u Let u be a point with weight 1 such that u is y-aligned with q1 and q7 and has a
smaller y-coordinate than each of them, and, moreover, u is x-aligned with p1 and p7
and has a smaller x-coordinate than each of them. Point u is z-blocked by blocker b(u).
Table 3: The construction in the proof of Theorem 2.
Point cx cy cz wgt
p1 1 + 3θ/4 1 1 θ
p2 1 + 3θ/4 1− 2θ/3 1 1
b(p2) (1 + θ)
2/θ 1− 2θ/3 1 θ
p3 1 + 3θ/4 1− 2θ/3 1 + θ/3 θ
p4 1 + θ/2 1− 2θ/3 1 + θ/3 1
b(p4) 1 + θ/2 1− 2θ/3 (1 + θ)
2/θ θ
p5 1 + θ/2 1− θ/3 1 + θ/3 θ
p6 1 + θ/2 1− θ/3 1 1
b(p6) (1 + θ)
2/θ 1− θ/3 1 θ
p7 1 + θ/2 1 1 θ
q1 1 1 + 2θ/3 1 θ
q2 1 1 + 2θ/3 1− 2θ/3 1
b(q2) 1 (1 + θ)
2/θ 1− 2θ/3 θ
q3 1 + θ/4 1 + 2θ/3 1− 2θ/3 θ
q4 1 + θ/4 1 + θ/3 1− 2θ/3 1
b(q4) (1 + θ)
2/θ 1 + θ/3 1− 2θ/3 θ
q5 1 + θ/4 1 + θ/3 1− θ/3 θ
q6 1 1 + θ/3 1− θ/3 1
b(q6) 1 (1 + θ)
2/θ 1− θ/3 θ
q7 1 1 + θ/3 1 θ
u 1 1 1 1
b(u) 1 1 (1 + θ)2/θ θ
Let us examine the possible deterministic allocations of the above construction. If u is not
allocated the maximum revenue does not exceed 7(1+ θ)2+(6+8θ)(1+ θ) ≤ 13+28θ+15θ2.
Otherwise, if u is allocated to player y or x, some of the other unit-weight points can not
be allocated to a non-blocked direction/player. To see why this is true, assume that u is
allocated to player y (the case that u is allocated to player x is symmetric). Then, points q2
and q6 can only be allocated to player x in a monotone allocation, thus point q4 can not be
allocated to any of its non-blocked directions. Again, the maximum revenue does not exceed
13 + 28θ + 15θ2.
Now, consider the randomized allocation in which the blockers are allocated to their
preferred direction, the unit-weight points are allocated equiprobably between their two non-
blocked directions, and the remaining points are allocated as follows: points q1, q7, and p5 are
allocated equiprobably between players y and z, points p1, p7, and q3 are allocated equiproba-
























Figure 2: The instance used in the proof of Theorem 2. Large black disks represent the
unit-weight points and smaller black disks represent points of weight θ that belong to the
main part of the construction. White disks denote blockers.
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x and z. Regarding the payments, it suffices to consider that the payment of some player,
e.g., x, that is allocated a fraction fx of some point p is at least the lowest x-coordinate among
the x-aligned points to p that have non-zero probability to be allocated to x times fx (see the
discussion after Observation 1). It can be easily verified that this is a monotone allocation
with revenue at least 7(1 + θ)2 + (7 + 8θ)(1 − θ) ≥ 14. The theorem follows since θ can take
any arbitrarily small positive value.
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A Proof of Observation 1
LetM = (x,p) be a truthful in expectation mechanism. We will first prove that allocation x
is monotone. Truthfulness in expectation implies that the following two inequalities hold for
any i, v−i, vi and v
′
i: (To simplify notation, we remove index i and the fixed argument v−i.)
x(v) · v − p(v) ≥ x(v′) · v − p(v′), (2)
and
x(v′) · v′ − p(v′) ≥ x(v) · v′ − p(v). (3)
By combining inequalities (2) and (3) we get
x(v) · v + x(v′) · v′ ≥ x(v′) · v + x(v) · v′.
The above inequality implies that(
x(v)− x(v′)
)
(v − v′) ≥ 0,
which, in turn, implies monotonicity.
Now, consider some fixed monotone allocation x. We will prove that assigning payments
p(vλ) = x(vλ) · vλ −
λ−1∑
k=1
x(vk) · (vk+1 − vk), (4)
yields the maximum achievable revenue by a truthful in expectation mechanismM, where vλ
denotes the λ-th possible valuation of i such that (vλ,v−i) occurs with positive probability,
for fixed i and v−i. Inequality (2) implies the following upper bound on the payments of M,
i.e, for any fixed i, and v−i and for any v and v
′, it holds that
p(v) ≤ x(v) · v − x(v′) · v + p(v′). (5)
Note that for fixed i, v−i, we can compute a tight upper bound on p(vλ) for every λ by
replacing inequality (5) with an equality and considering it as a recursion on λ with p(v0) = 0,
i.e., p(vλ) = x(vλ) · vλ − x(vλ−1) · vλ + p(vλ−1). In this way, we obtain the payments defined
by equality (4), which we denote by p. Now, assume that there exists a set of (different)
payments p′, such that M′ = (x,p′) is truthful in expectation and achieves higher revenue
than M = (x,p). It holds that there exists a valuation vector (vw,v−i) such that (for some
player i) p′(vw) > p(vw). Consider the smallest such valuation vm, i.e., p
′(vm) > p(vm) and
p′(vm−1) ≤ p(vm−1). It holds that
p(vm) < p
′(vm)
≤ x(vm) · vm − x(vm−1) · vm + p
′(vm−1)
≤ x(vm) · vm − x(vm−1) · vm + p(vm−1)
= x(vm) · vm −
m−1∑
k=1
x(vk) · (vk+1 − vk),
where the second inequality follows by inequality (5), sinceM′ is truthful in expectation, and
the equality follows by substituting p(vm−1) using (4). However, the above strict inequality
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regarding p(vm) contradicts the fact that p is defined by equality (4). We conclude that
the payments defined by equality (4) yield the maximum revenue that can be achieved by a
truthful in expectation mechanism that applies a given allocation x.
To prove our final claim, we consider a mechanism M = (x,p) such that allocation x
is monotone and p is defined by equality (4). We will prove that M = (x,p) is truthful in
expectation. It suffices to prove inequality (2), which is equivalent to showing that for any i,
v−i, vλ and vλ′ it holds that
x(vλ) · vλ − p(vλ) ≥ x(vλ′) · vλ − p(vλ′).
By substituting the payments using equality (4), we get
λ−1∑
k=1
x(vk) · (vk+1 − vk) ≥ x(vλ′) · vλ − x(vλ′) · vλ′ +
λ′−1∑
k=1
x(vk) · (vk+1 − vk). (6)




x(vk) · (vk+1 − vk) ≥
λ−1∑
k=λ′
x(vλ′) · (vk+1 − vk)
= x(vλ′) · (vλ − vλ′),
where inequality (6) holds by monotonicity and the fact that λ ≥ λ′ implies vλ ≥ vλ′ .
Otherwise, if λ < λ′ it holds that
λ′−1∑
k=λ
x(vk) · (vk+1 − vk) ≤
λ′−1∑
k=λ
x(vλ′) · (vk+1 − vk)
= x(vλ′) · (vλ′ − vλ),
and the proof is complete.
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